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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #04876/87-1 30 November 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Distribution

FROM:

Marten van Heuven

National Intelligence Officer for Europe

SUBJECT:

November Warning and Forecast Report

- 1. Attached is our report to the DCI based on the Warning Meeting held on 18 November 1987.
- 2. Next month's warning meeting will be held on Wednesday,
  16 December, at 1025 in Room 7E62 CIA Headquarters. Please telephone
  attendance plans to \_\_\_\_\_\_\_and have clearances certified by
  NOON Monday, 14 December.

3. I encourage you to phone in suggestions for the agenda and names of volunteers to make opening presentations. It would be helpful to have your comments for the next meeting by COB Tuesday, 8 December.

Marten yan Heuver

Attachment

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SECRET \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #04876/87-2 30 November 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Central Intelligence

VIA:

National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM:

Marten van Heuven

National Intelligence Officer for Europe

SUBJECT:

November Warning and Forecast Report

## I. MAIN DISCUSSION TOPICS

## A. PORTUGAL: PRESSURE FOR REVIEWING THE BASING AGREEMENT

- l. Discussion. The Portuguese government is committed to a mid-term review of the US basing agreement but is still weighing its options as to how to proceed. One option is for informal discussions in a low key; this approach would fit the generally nonconfrontational style the Portuguese favor and allow domestic policies to be given undivided attention. Prime Minister Cavaco Silva may opt for a more formal renegotiation, however: he has criticized the Socialist coalition for failing to drive a hard bargain the last time around, and he may judge that his party's new parliamentary majority gives him added clout.
- 2. Portuguese leaders across the political spectrum (excluding the Communists) support the security relationship with the US, but there is also a widely shared belief that the US could do more for Portugal than it does. And a perceived slight such as the long absence of a US ambassador tends to support the view that the US takes Portugal for granted.
- 3. <u>Warning Notice</u>. Cavaco's lack of negotiating experience could introduce uncertainties into the process. And his New York Times interview may have taught him that standing up to the US plays well at home.

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B. YUGOSLAVIA:	NEW SIGNS OF INSTABI	<u>ITY</u>
l. <u>Discussion</u> minority Serbian popul rhetoric, persuaded fe Their presence was bil one aimed at either Se success. Continued pu	Tation in Kosovo, coupederal authorities to led as a general peacerbs or Albanians; and urges of the Kosovo le	etween native Albanians and the pled with shrill nationalistic dispatch special police units. e-keeping mission, rather than I for now the mission seems a eadership and factionalism withing to keep tensions at a high
on the credibility of Prime Minister Mikulic compromise on economic Mikulic next faces a the Yugoslavs must reacher creditors; the mproviding for the concwhile allowing Mikulic resign rather than acconditions as a standby Yugoslavia.) Even if the economic outlook is	the Yugoslav leaders' is resignation. Have policy with the Slowest with Western creach some debt resched nost likely outcome iditionality on which is to save face domest cept an INF standby; by, but without the stand the Yugoslavs pass the Yugoslavs pass the for rampant inflating workers will effect	conditions have taken their toll rip, and calls have increased for ing patched together an uneasy venian and Croatian leaderships, litors. By the end of December aling agreement with the IMF and for an Extended Fund Facility, Western creditors will insist ically. (He had threatened to the EFF could stipulate the same tigma that term has acquired in his immediate financial hurdle, ion and rising unemployment; and ively block implementation of y program.
the face of worsening capacity of the system suspect. The departure	economic conditions to survive more sere of Mikulic thro political cohesion	as shown surprising resiliency in and ethnic rivalries, but the ious challenges is increasingly ugh resignation or removaland invite heightened ethnic
serious violend reaction, ultin police units.	ce could trigger an e mately overwhelming t Should the Serbian l	ash point: an eruption of scalating cycle of repression and second and federal eadership push for tougher onfrontation could ensue.
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